While black-white parity has not yet been achieved in the United States, many gauges relating to economic and political empowerment have shown extraordinary convergence. Over the past 40 years, for instance, the black-white ratio of median earnings for male full-time workers increased from .50 to .73 (Welch, 2003) and the racial disparity in life expectancy decreased from 6.8 to 5.3 years (author's calculations using data from the National Center of Health Statistics). For the first time, recent cohorts of black and white children with similar backgrounds enter school on equal footing (Fryer and Levitt, 2004) .
But in the most intimate spheres of life -religion, residential location, marriage, and cohabitation -far less convergence has occurred. Martin Luther King Jr. famously noted in a number of his speeches that "the 11 o'clock hour on Sunday is the most segregated hour in American life" (for example, see King, 1956 ). Today, an estimated 90 percent of Americans worship primarily with members of their race or ethnicity (Stodgill and Bower, 2002) . Residential segregation, though lower today than in 1970, remains remarkably high. In a typical American city, 64 percent of blacks would have to change neighborhoods to ensure an even distribution of blacks across the city (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 1999) . Even friendship networks within seemingly integrated public schools are remarkably segregated; the typical student has .7 friends of a different race (Echenique and Fryer, forthcoming) .
Historically, there was a distinction between economic and political equality on one side and social equality on the other (Woodward, 1955) . Courts often stated that blacks would be made equal under the law but remain subordinate in informal, intimate spheres of life. In Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537 [1896] ), the U.S. Supreme Court argued that integration in schools, parks, railroads, and courts could not be mandated because they were private, social concerns. Laws governing social interactions, like whom to marry and where to live, were the last civil rights to be granted.
In this paper, I focus on one aspect of social intimacy -marriages across black, white and Asian racial lines. The paper begins with a brief history of the regulation of race and romance in America. Then, using census data from 1880-2000, an analysis of interracial marriage uncovers a rich set of cross-section and time-series patterns.
Marrying across racial lines is a rare event, even today. Interracial marriages account for approximately 1 percent of white marriages, 5 percent of black marriages and 14 percent of Asian marriages. Among married whites, 0.4 percent choose to marry blacks and 0.6 percent choose to marry Asians. Among married blacks, 4.6 percent intermarry with whites and 0.5 percent with Asians. Asians intermarry almost exclusively with whiteswhite spouses comprise 13.2 percent of all Asian marriages and blacks roughly 1 percent.
1
The data are most consistent with a Becker-style marriage market model in which objective criteria of a potential spouse, their race, and the social price of intermarriage are central. The evidence in favor of the classic Becker model is far from overwhelming and hinges on several plausible (but untestable) assumptions. Yet it is the only hypothesis I test, including a social exchange theory of marriage that dominates the sociology literature and a marriage theory based on random search and social interactions, which does not contradict the data in important ways.
1 Throughout history, interracial intimacy has been taboo and there may be considerable underreporting of interracial marriage. This bias likely changes over time and may influence the time series variation as well as the cross-sectional estimates. The estimates are likely lower bounds on the amount of interracial marriage that actually occurs. Yet, because interracial marriage is concrete and verifiable, this concern is less in the marriage data than questions regarding cohabitation, dating, or sexual preferences.
Ultimately, social intimacy is a way of measuring whether or not a majority group views a minority group on equal footing. In most information-based theories of discrimination, stereotyping, stigma, and inequality, social intimacy leads to less discrimination and improved outcomes for racial minority groups (for example, Fryer and Jackson, 2003; Rosch, 1978 ; see also Loury, 2002 , for a conceptual discussion of racial stigma). Relatedly, Patterson (2002) argues that "social death," the treating of individuals as less than full persons, is the real historical tragedy of racial relations in the United States.
While the primary motivations for this paper are the divisions between political and social inequality that are deeply embedded in the unlovely history of black-white relations in America, and how interracial intimacy may be a more appropriate barometer for closing this divide than labor market statistics, some of the more interesting patterns in the data concern Asian intermarriage. As a group, Asians did not face the intensity or longevity of social ostracism endured by blacks, but for many years the U.S. placed strict quotas on immigrants from Asia. This legacy may explain why the time-series patterns look so similar to blacks. The civil rights movement was liberating for all racial groups.
There are literatures on interracial intimacy in law and sociology (for example, Moran, 2003; Kennedy, 2003; Romano, 2003; Wallenstein, 2002 , and the references therein). This paper takes first steps toward an understanding of the importance of interracial intimacy for economists as a benchmark for race relations.
A Brief History of Romance, Regulation, and Race When slavery replaced indentured servitude as the primary source of labor in the upper regions of the South during the last decades of the seventeenth century, whites began to work in close contact with blacks. In some cases co-workers became intimate and blurred the color line (Moran, 2003) . Anti-miscegenation laws -laws that forbade marrying across racial lines -became a way to draw a distinction between black and white; slave and free. The Chesapeake colonies, now Maryland and Virginia, were the first to enact statutes that punished whites for racial mixing. In Virginia, the law instructed that a white spouse be banished from the Colony within three months of an interracial wedding. This penalty was increased to six months in jail in 1705. In Maryland, if a white woman married a black man she became a slave to her husband's master. Interracial marriage laws also ensured that blacks could not have access to inheritance. Over time, bans on interracial marriage and corresponding social taboos were also directed at Asian groups like Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos--especially in western states. However, miscegenation has always been legal for Native Americans and Hispanics. Interracial pairings are made using the "spouse location" variable which allows one to search through a census household to identify a given person's spouse, and then to identify demographic data about the spouse. 2 An interracial marriage is defined as a marriage between two individuals who report a different race when the census is taken.
Three racial groups are analyzed: Asians, blacks, and whites. All other racial groups and individuals without valid responses to race are dropped from the sample. Other racial categories were omitted because their definitions have not remained constant over time and very often the sample of intermarriages involving these groups is too small. Unless otherwise specified, the denominator used to calculate the rates of intermarriage for a racial group is the number of married persons within that group. In our sample, Asians comprise 1.4 percent, blacks 11.3 percent, and whites the remainder. 3 It is quite remarkable, in a purely statistical sense, that white males and Asian females are the most prevalent interracial marriage. However, the fact that black-Asian intermarriage occurs so rarely could be due to their relatively small shares of the population, and need not imply negative preferences for one another. Unadjusted means of interracial marriages need to be interpreted with care. 
Racial Intermarriage Relative to All Marriage

Adjusting for Relative Supply
The relative supply of each racial group will affect its intermarriage rate. For example, Asians will be likely to have higher rates of intermarriage because they make up only 1.4 percent of the sample -and thus Asians live in a population where 98.6 percent of the marriage prospects are non-Asian. Whites, at the other extreme, make up 87.3 percent of the sample, which means that they live in a population where only 12.7 percent of their marriage prospects are non-white.
There are several ways to adjust the trends of interracial marriage for the relative population of each racial group. One straightforward way is to weight each rate by the relative populations of the two groups. Thus, if there are twice as many blacks as Asians, and the raw intermarriage rate of whites to the two groups is the same, then the adjusted Asian rate would be twice the adjusted black rate. As such, the numbers can be interpreted as the intermarriage rates that would obtain if the population shares were equal and each person still had the same chance of intermarrying as before.
Adjusting in this way provides a different portrait of interracial marriage. Among whites, the proclivity to marry Asians increases even more due to the small numbers of Asians in the population. Black men become most likely to marry Asian women, not white women! This is in stark contrast to Figure 1 and many popular perceptions of interracial pairings. Black male-white female and black female-Asian male matches occur with roughly the same frequency. Unions between black women and white men become the least likely combination, given the population weights of the two groups.
Asian women marry outside their race significantly more than Asian men -with rates roughly equal between white and black men. When Asian men marry outside the race, it is typically with white women.
Another way to look at the importance of supply in interracial marriage is to consider the importance of immigration policies as an important supply-side component. 
Intermarriage by Education Level
There seems to be some conventional wisdom that interracial marriages are concentrated among those with lower levels of education, but while this claim used to be true several decades ago, the pattern has reversed itself and interracial marriages are now more concentrated among those with higher levels of education. From 1940-1960, whites with less than a high school level of education were the most likely to intermarry, at a rate of about 0.1 percent of all marriages, while intermarriage among higher-educated groups was essentially zero. In the 1960s and 1970s, whites with higher education levels begin to show a marked increase in miscegenation rates while intermarriage rates among the least-educated tailed off just a bit. In 2000, white men with some college education or more than a college education had an intermarriage rates above .4 percent, and white women in these education categories had intermarriage rates above .25 percent. The trend has continued since. The military is currently believed to be as racially integrated as any U.S. institution, although blacks may still lag in officer representation, especially at the highest ranks (MacGregor, 1985) .
Across Regions and States
Intermarriage rates can vary across geographical regions and historical legal
climates -which to some extent overlap.
For a regional breakdown, I split the data into five geographical regions: South, North, Midwest, Mountain West, and Pacific West. I also focused here on intermarriage rates for native-born whites and blacks, to limit the impact of recent immigrants, and as a result, Asians were omitted because there were very few interracial pairings for domesticborn Asians in the early part of the sample. Between 1880 and 1960, white intermarriage rates are quite low across all regions-under .05 percent--and no region consistently has a higher or lower rate than the others. This finding is quite surprising, given the perception that racial attitudes towards blacks differed substantially by region (Litwack, 1961 
Can Shifting Social and Economic Status Explain Patterns of Interracial
Marriage?
The types of individuals who choose to intermarry have changed over the twentieth century; for example, intermarriage has shifted from being primarily a phenomenon of the less-educated to being primarily a phenomenon of the more-educated.
Moreover, the social and economic status of racial groups has shifted over time. These kinds of changes can potentially explain some of the patterns in the data. Thus, it is useful to explore the extent to which differences in patterns of interracial marriage can be explained by factors like age, education, income, veteran status, and location.
The previous analyses demonstrate that the types of individuals who choose to intermarry have changed over the twentieth century. This, coupled with the shifting social and economic status of racial groups, can potentially explain some of the patterns in the data. For instance, if residential location at birth becomes an important predictor of intermarriage and Asians are more likely than blacks to be born in close proximity to whites, this factor could partially explain why whites intermarry with Asians more than blacks.
To understand this more formally, I decompose the share of the difference in the trends of interracial marriage between blacks and Asians (why white men marry Asian women more than black women, for example) which are attributable to (plausibly) exogenous characteristics such as age, birthplace, residential location, education, and veteran status. Put differently, I am interested in testing whether white males marry Asian females at higher rates than black males because Asian females are objectively "better" mates or whether they are using asymmetric standards to choose a mate. Oaxaca (1973) provides a straightforward way of calculating such decompositions. The key idea involves estimating race-specific regression equations to glean weights placed on various characteristics of mates for each potential racial match.
Since there are significant differences in the propensity of different genders within a racial group to intermarry, I also look at each gender combination. Thus, the differences I decompose compare men of one racial group against men of another racial group, and likewise for women. In symbols, I estimate the following equation for each race/gender combination within each census year:
, where X is a vector of relevant covariates such as age, education, income, veteran status, and location.
A skeletal outline of the implementation of the decompositions is as follows. 8 For each pairing of interest, like black men versus white men, I compute the difference in their mean intermarriage rates. Since ordinary least squares estimated equations hold exactly for the sample means, I find the share of this difference unexplained by the differences in the mean characteristics in X by calculating the differences in the estimated coefficients multiplied by the mean of X for one of the groups and then dividing by the mean difference in intermarriage rates. The share of the difference remaining is then the share explained by the difference in mean values of X between the two groups.
The interpretation of a share between 0 and 1 is straightforward; it represents the share of the difference in mean intermarriage rates explained by the different mean 8 For readers interested in the details of such decompositions, see Oaxaca (1973 For most of the comparisons, the scores are negative, suggesting that the differences in mean characteristics predict a gap in interracial marriage in the opposite direction from the one which actually exists. For example, black men intermarry more than white men, but according to measured characteristics, it should be the other way around (and with a spike around 1960). White men have greater professional status, education, and income, all of which predict that white men will intermarry more than black men. Similarly, geographic variables such as Pacific West also predict more white intermarriage than black. For the gap between white and Asian women, measured characteristics explain some of the difference in interracial marriage in 1940 and 1950, but then the share explained steadily decreases and turns negative. The Asian/black time series for women is rather variable, and always negative. In this case, for Asian women, higher income and living in the northeast are positively associated with intermarriage, while these factors are negatively related to intermarriage among black women.
Overall, the effectiveness of the set of (plausibly) exogenous covariates to explain racial differences in interracial marriage varies significantly from year to year and racial group to racial group. Changing group characteristics do little to explain the observed time trends in interracial marriages among any of the groups under study except perhaps for Asian and white men in the years 1960-2000 or for white and black women. In short, one clearly needs to look at more than group characteristics to account for the differences in interracial marriage across race and gender groups that are found in the data. White female-black male is the second most common pairing, constituting 6 percent of black male marriages. Asian-black marriages are virtually nonexistent. Adjusting for the relative supply of each racial group in the population provides a different portrait of interracial marriage -particularly for intermarriage with Asians whose small numbers can make the raw calculations deceiving. Intermarriage rates differ substantially by education, geographic considerations, and veteran status. The most striking patterns are those concerning the reversal in the role of education in intermarriage. In the middle of the twentieth century the least educated were more likely to be in an interracial marriage, but by the end of the century, the most educated were the most likely to intermarry.
In this section, we investigate the extent to which three theories of interracial marriage can account for this rich set of facts. The first theory is the most well known in sociology: social exchange theory (Merton, 1940) . The remaining two are economic models: a search model and a Becker-style marriage market model (Becker, 1973) .
Social Exchange Theories
The leading theory in sociology to explain intermarriage between racial groups is social exchange theory. This approach was originally laid out in Merton (1940); Blau (1964) and Kalmijn (1993) offer some interesting extensions of the basic model. The ideas are similar to some models of hedonic pricing in economics (Rosen, 1974) .
Let individuals be represented by a vector of characteristics: attractiveness, sense of humor, height, weight, race, gender, family wealth, criminal record, and so on.
Suppose the value of a person in a marriage market depends on that person's objective value, given a person's vector of characteristics, and the societal cost of marrying an individual with such characteristics. Further, assume that all else equal, marrying across racial lines is a cost.
The predictions of the social exchange theory are clear. For whites, given they are believed to be on top of the social hierarchy, interracial marriage will always come at a social cost, though interracial marriage with whites is a benefit to other groups. In equilibrium, then, whites must be compensated for their higher social status by intermarrying with racial minorities who possess more redeeming qualities. In minoritywhite marriages, the minorities will have superior objective characteristics -like being more attractive or intelligent -than their white mates. Thus, the social exchange model refers to a trade between objective characteristics and social status.
Social exchange theory is successful at capturing some elements of the data. For example, if one assumes that the societal cost of intermarriage fell sharply during the 1960s, then one can explain the increase in miscegenation after that time. If one further assumes that the societal cost of marrying Asians differs (in specific ways) from intermarrying with blacks, the relative magnitudes of Asian and black intermarriage with whites can be obtained. Further, a more general model of social exchange in which societal costs of interracial marriage decrease as objective value increases picks up further subtleties in the data.
However, this theory fails to explain the characteristics of who marries whom in interracial unions, which is really the key prediction of the theory. For several decades, those that choose to intermarry are the most highly educated. If anything, blacks who choose to intermarry with whites are less educated than those who intramarry, which directly contradicts the theory.
Search/Interaction Models
A search/interaction marriage model, like the one developed in Adachi (2003) , contains no own-race preference for mates embedded in the model. Instead, interracial marriages arise in this model due only to interaction with members of other groups. In this kind of model, in each period a single man (or woman) randomly meets a single woman (or man), whose type is a random draw from the distribution of types. The paired agents discover the partner's type upon meeting, and each agent decides whether to mate with the partner or not. They will mate if both agree, which means that for each agent, the prospect of marriage with the current potential partner exceeds some reservation level of utility. If at least one does not agree to mate, they separate, forget about the other agent's identity and look for other partners in the next period. Adachi also imposes conditions like no side payments, and no bargaining over the terms of marriage. Also, all single men and women are assumed to be risk neutral, have a common discount factor, and maximize their expected utilities. A profile of reservation utilities for men and women constitutes a market equilibrium if men and women maximize their expected utility.
A model of this sort makes a number of predictions about interracial marriage.
Holding all else constant, increasing the mean value of members of a certain minority group yields increased interracial marriage. Fixing the mean and increasing the variability (more extremes) also increases miscegenation, as agents will ignore those that are below their reservation value and mate with those above. The model also predicts that lower frequency of interaction with minority groups and higher societal costs of intermixing both decrease intermarriage between whites and minorities.
I attempted several simulations of a simplified random matching model along these lines. Of course, random matching is a stretch of the imagination, but it is much more tractable and absent a model of how one chooses a mate, I assume random matching among the set of mates who exceed a person's reservation value.
To begin, I looked at the characteristics of people who choose to marry according Without delving into the specifics, the results of such simulations don't come anywhere close to matching the actual data on interracial marriage. In terms of magnitudes, the simulated rates of racial intermarriage are large relative to the actual rates; often the predicted rate is orders of magnitude higher. That is, if people were 10 The simulation had seven steps. 1) I estimated for each year an empirical distribution over types of people who choose to marry by calculating for each gender/age/educational category the number of such people who have spouses in each age/educational category. 2) For each age/educational combination, I find the weight placed on that combination as a potential spouse by each gender/age/educational group by dividing the number of such pairings by the total number of marriages for the gender/age/education category. 3) I find the number of people in each race who are in each age/education category and multiply this by the weight found in the previous step, which gives the expected number of pairings between people in each race/age/education group and people in each gender/age/educational group. 4) For each gender/age/educational category, I find the share who are in each race, which allows one to calculate the expected number of pairings for each race, age, and educational combination of spouses. Fifth, summing these expected pairings over age, education, and gender, I find the total number of expected pairings between any two racial groups. Sixth, to determine intermarriage rates between two races, I sum these expected numbers across different cities (for a given year), weighting by city population. Seventh, dividing these totals by the total number of marriages for the relevant race allows me to calculate the simulated intermarriage rates for each race. 
Equilibrium Sorting and the Market for Marriage
In his seminal work on the economic approach to understanding marriage, Becker Consider the marriage decision between women and men each deciding whom to marry among numerous potential mates. For simplicity, assume that all individuals prefer to be married relative to remaining single. All household commodities that are to be produced in a marriage are assumed to be combined into a single aggregate output, and these commodities include quality and quantity of children, prestige and social standing, companionship, love, and the like. In this setting, each household has a production function for its overall aggregate output which is made up of three different categories of inputs: inputs bought in the market, for which income must be earned; inputs produced directly with the time of household members; and "environmental" variables such as societal attitudes of interracial marriages or its views on the children of such marriages.
Individuals also face exogenous constraints like their market wage, their time, and their property income.
In this framework, a marriage will occur when the total output for two people from being married exceeds the sum of their utility from remaining single. Each individual is assumed to be able to calculate the output that results from any combination of man and woman in the marriage market. The sorting that maximizes the total output over all marriages is the equilibrium allocation of the marriage market. The equilibrium of this market (identical to the concept of "core" in cooperative game theory), has the property that no two unmarried persons can marry and make one better off without making the other worse off.
To relate the model back to the data, consider the optimal sorting of individuals in a marriage market when men and women differ in observable traits like race, education, and others. From Becker's foundational theory we know that a key issue is whether traits are substitutes or complements in household production. If traits are substitutes, then people will tend to marry those with traits unlike themselves, called "negative assortative mating." If traits are complements, then people will tend to marry those with traits like themselves, called "positive assortative mating."
For simplicity, consider a derivative of the model in which individuals can only differ on two traits: black or white race and high or low human capital. In this setting, it is straightforward to show (under mild assumptions about the relative numbers of each type and assuming a cost of interracial marriage) that if race is more of a cost to household output than low education, the marriage market will segregate on race. Essentially, those with high human capital will have their pick of a spouse within their racial group. If the cost of race is less important than education, then one gets interracial mixing and positive assortative matching on education. Marriages within race will be more prevalent, because there is still a mild cost of intermarriage. But individuals of all racial groups who choose to intermarry will be more highly educated. These predictions fit the facts observed in the cross-sectional data.
To capture the time series patterns, one needs to assume that between 1880 and 1960 race was the most important attribute in a marriage market for all racial groups.
This assumption is plausible enough: after all, interracial marriage during this time was illegal in many states and possessed enormous social costs in others. Even in states without bans on interracial marriage, marriages across racial lines were extremely rare.
During the social transformation of America in the 1960s, blind racism began to decrease and other attributes of a mate became more important, causing the increase in interracial marriage. Finally, if one assumes that marriage to Asians is less costly socially than marriage to blacks, one produces the differences in magnitudes of interracial marriages across racial groups along with the trends.
In summary, although the evidence in favor of the marriage market model is far from overwhelming, it is the only theory examined which does not yield predictions that are directly at odds with the observed patterns in the data. However, the basic facts and models discussed here only scratch the surface of understanding of the importance of interracial intimacy. The next steps involve understanding its causes and consequences:
that is, what affects interracial intimacy and what interracial intimacy affects. This path may take us a long way toward a better understanding of the subtle racial dynamics at play in our society. 
